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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: Italian Army: The Ordinary Soldier. From the analysis of the past, the instrument of the future.

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THESIS: The paper identifies the factors that have contributed to the success of the Italian conscript troops in performing Peace Support Operations. Then, it offer a pattern to translate such aspects into doctrine, training and organizational changes to adapt them to a volunteer Army in order to successfully face future challenges.

DISCUSSION: As the number of nations that deployed soldiers to perform peace support operations tasks, grew in size, one thing became clear: no armed forces in the world had done any major preparation for the new mission. The large majority of soldiers deployed in these operations, most of the time improvised, some time made the most out of a strong combat training, others tried to adapt a strong warrior spirit to peacekeeping. For many it was and still remains a frustrating activity, others, however found the new mission more appropriate and in line with their mind-set. Despite the fact that many doctrinal publications or field manuals have been produced to understanding peacekeeping, the shift from warfighting and the warrior mind-set to peacekeeping and the peacekeeper's mind-set is extremely slow. However, one thing is clear today and it is that many of the skills, whether practical or mental, associated with peacekeeping are of great importance to dominate "the battle field" of the future. While war has become an increasingly more sophisticated technological effort, peace support operations, but also stabilization operations and the so-called phase four emphasize the "human" factor, with its ability to observe, to assess and to act according to practical wisdom. In simple words the technological warrior is going to be successful in the traditional battlefield, yet the warrior that is going to win the aftermath needs different skill, where human is central. In this context, we identified the factors that have contributed to the success of the Italian troops in performing military operation in response to CE and we offered a point of view on how to translate such factors into doctrinal, training and organizational changes in order to allow the future army to be successful in CE.

CONCLUSION: It is clear enough that in addition to the standard military tasks assigned to the combat forces, the future Army should be able to efficiently undertake a wide range of activities related to the economy, living conditions and the democratic institutions of the Country where operations are conducted. In this context, the reorganization of the future Army with the development of a multi-role component to be built up in parallel to the combat component, will enhance its capabilities to successfully deal with CE. The specialized training and education to be provided to all the personnel in the units, in conjunction with the perception of a "less warrior" soldier, will enhance the ability of the military to interact with other organizations. This factor will definitely help to overcome the natural friction developed among all the diverse actors and it will powerfully contribute to build an effective partnership with many of them.

Introduction

This paper focuses on Complex Emergencies¹ (CE) as the most probable form of future conflict. It emphasizes that factors such as responsibility, commonsense, empathy and aptitude to accept uncertainty play a significant role in the performance of military contingents deployed in response to CE. Such qualities characterize the nature of the conscript Italian soldier and they can explain the success of the Italian troops in CE. Today, such traits have been inherited by the Yearly Service Volunteer,² the modern equivalent of the conscript in the Italian Army. This paper offers a standpoint on how to convert such virtues into doctrinal, training and organizational changes in order to allow a modern volunteer Army to face future challenges.

In this context, all the military power factors are pertinent to our study.

Military power is the result of two factors: human and physical. The physical factor is the warfighting hardware; from the organizational structure of the military instruments to the means used by the soldiers to fight. The human factor consists of two different components: psychological, and intellectual. The intellectual component is represented by doctrine and procedures adopted within the military organization. The psychological aspects are: effective leadership personnel, management and motivation. While the material aspect is strictly related to innovations and improvements of technology, the intellectual but especially the psychological are linked to the development of training and education.³

As the number of nations that have deployed soldiers to perform peacekeeping - and more broadly peace support operations tasks - grew in size, one thing became clear: no armed forces in the world had done any major preparation for the new mission. Despite the fact that many doctrinal publications or field manuals have been produced to understand peacekeeping and although now a large number of courses on peacekeeping training are available and taken by a growing number of soldiers, the peacekeepers' mind-set still does not really exist. The shift from warfighting and the warrior mind-set to peacekeeping and the peacekeeper's mind-set is extremely slow. While war has become an increasingly more sophisticated technological effort, peace support operations, but also

stabilization operations and the so-called phase four, emphasize the human factor, with its ability to observe, to assess and to act according to practical wisdom. In simple words the technological warrior is going to win in the traditional battlefield, yet the warrior who is going to be successful in all other environments needs different skill, where the human is central.

In order to make sure that those factors are preserved and transmitted, it is important to understand the reasons why a country performs better than others in CE.

Complex Emergencies

According to British General Obe Applegate Complex Emergencies are international crises characterized by a lack of consensus among the intervening parties concerning the ends to be achieved, the ways to be followed and the means to be used in order to resolve the crisis.⁴ The environment in which CE develop is characterized by several aspects. They usually develop in a multidimensional setting characterized by an internal and violent social turmoil, that can be generated from asymmetrical economic growth, religious differences, ethnic and tribal identities, lack of democracy or total breakdown of authority. The outcome is a complicated situation characterized by widespread infrastructure damages, economic collapse, poor or non-existent health care, massive movement of displaced people and exacerbation of violence which can easily escalate into conflict and therefore requires an international response. The effects of CE are well represented by Sergio Vieira de Mello:⁵ “Breaches of human rights and humanitarian law, including mutilation, rape, forced displacement, denial of the right to food and medicines, diversion of aid and attacks on medical personnel and hospitals are no longer inevitable by-products of war. They have become the means to achieve a strategic goal. As a result even low intensity conflicts generate enormous human suffering. Humanitarian needs are disproportionate to the scale of military conflict. Meeting these needs has become more difficult, as the dividing line between soldiers and civilians has grown blurred.”⁶ The difficulty of CE is also increased by the existence of a number of actors, ranging from government authorities to non-state entities (insurgents, criminal organizations, NGOs, private organizations etc.), motivated by dissimilar

aims and agendas. Therefore, the environment is much more intricate, unpredictable and volatile than the modern arena where conventional operations are conducted. However, what gives CE their unique character is the political aspect. “Some situations that are described as complex emergencies could also be argued to be, in effect, deep and protracted political crisis engendered by profound social change, or sometimes even the lack of it. Most emergencies stem from the complex interaction among a wide variety of social, economic and political factors.”⁷

The similarities of those aspects explained above and stability operations are evident.⁸ Indeed, we believe stability operations are one type of CE. Since CE is likely to be the more probable form of conflict in the future, it is worthwhile to analyze what factors can contribute to cause the military to be successful.⁹

How To Deal With Complex Emergencies To Achieve Success.

CE are different from warfighting because while the latter is won by conducting a sequence of battles, the former can be won by conducting a sequence of confrontations.¹⁰ A confrontation is defined as “a situation in which victory consists of compelling, persuading, or inducing others to submit to our will without, if possible, using violence, although violence, as well as other threats and inducements, must be a credible part of our armory.”¹¹

In the light of this concept, CE are anything but Clausewitzian. Indeed, military operations in response to CE have more to do with political stability and humanitarian assistance, rather than physically compelling an enemy to submit to our will.¹² In these situations, “objectives cannot be achieved by force alone: the weak are not strong enough and the strong face an enemy that avoids decisive encounters by vanishing into the environment. Although such operations are conducted by the military, they can succeed only by reaching a political solution, and this solution cannot be reached by high level decision makers alone because it must be grounded in the hopes and fears of the foot-soldiers fighting on behalf of the weak.”¹³ To further complicate the situation, there is the requirement of cooperation between military forces and NGOs that share responsibility for mission objectives and must take them over when the military leaves. Military commanders must negotiate

with conflicting parties rather than fight them.¹⁴ Thus, to be successful in this environment, military skills are essential, but also impartiality, neutrality, empathy, moral courage and a great deal of patience and restraint in the use of force. Skills that normally are not part of the military toolbox are vital.

Due to the high level of uncertainty that characterizes the environment in which CE develops, any minor scale event at the tactical level could have unforeseen effects at the political and military strategic level.¹⁵ CE are affected by a “fog of peace” that is as infamous as Clausewitz's “fog of war.”¹⁶ Like Clausewitz’s idea, the fog of peace rejects the notion that outcomes can be precisely predicted or that there is a prescribed rulebook for success that any military can follow.¹⁷ The complexity of such a situation is explained by Thomas Britt: “unclear rules of engagement for defense, lack of proper training for the mission, restricted ability to act in the face of threat or abuse, unclear standard to judge if a mission is successful, question about the relevance of peacekeeping mission to a “soldier identity,” soldier doubts about their ability to truly alter the stalemate, concerns about having to switch from being a peacekeeper to being a warrior, questions about whether the military will reward participation in peacekeeping operations, and questions about the overall importance of peacekeeping operations.”¹⁸ The situation the military faces goes far beyond the traditional warfighting training received. There are cultural issues, problems with the welfare, food, shelter of traumatized populations; issues of government; cultural, ethnic and religious problems; historical issues; economic matters to deal with that are not part of the METT [Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops and Time available] process necessarily.¹⁹

Therefore, success in CE requires a comprehensive, coordinated and holistic approach to simultaneously address all the aspects of the crisis: humanitarian, political, economic, military and security. Even if this is not a job for soldiers, it is clear that only soldiers can do it²⁰ due to the fact they are the first to reach the theatre of operation until the situation becomes safe enough to allow other agencies to operate.

In the CE environment other tasks have become important: the ability to train local security forces, to improve or rebuild local infrastructures, to create jobs and, overall, to interact with the local population. These new kind of missions performed by military organizations require new training and education programs. Indeed, without a proper education, tailored training and appropriate force structure, the military could experience difficulties in the attempt to temper their war-fighter (warrior spirit) attitude. To deal effectively with CE, the long-established military training programs used to prepare the soldier to fight and win the Nation's wars are only partially useful to soldiers' preparation.

The focus is to strengthen or to remodel the framework of the society²¹ and this task can be accomplished only in cooperation with other organizations. Therefore, in order to succeed in CE, a vital skill for a soldier is the ability not only to connect with the local population, but also to interact with a broad range of actors such as NGOs, IOs and media representatives. However, the focus on the "human" interaction often implies the willingness to accept higher risks, especially at the very beginning of the mission. Indeed, the acceptance of a lower level of force protection, allowing the troops not to wear helmets, flak jackets or to carry heavy weapons, could be very helpful in the process to facilitate the contact with other actors in the theatre of operation.²² In this situation we strongly believe that an appropriate level of force protection could be assured through an alternative system, such as civil military activities aimed to win "hearts and minds" of the population.²³ In order to facilitate the human connection between the local population and military forces, it is necessary that the latter becomes part of the local environment. Therefore, the locals must perceive the soldier as one of them. In this context, the technological aspects of the military loose importance, while the qualities of the human being become essential.

In this kind of environment, bottom-up initiative and autonomous decision making of lower hierarchical levels can profoundly affect operations.²⁴

The Unexpected Incidence Of The Human Factor In The Italian Soldier

We have decided to investigate Italy as a military force contributor to deal with CE.²⁵

Within her broad experience of military deployments in CE,²⁶ we have decided to consider three major deployments - Lebanon, Somalia and Albania - as the best demonstrations of the ability to be connected with the indigenous inhabitants and act as part of the local environment.

Since its first major deployment in Lebanon, Italy was not an exception, compared to other countries. Besides a sound military training and few weeks of PK preparation - more than anything else focused on how to set up a checkpoint - Italian soldiers had no special or specific preparation that could be identified as different from the one received from other peacekeepers. When the Lebanese Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of the Foreign Affairs requested the intervention of an international military force, Italy agreed with the US and France to deploy the 2nd *Bersaglieri* “*Governolo*” battalion,²⁷ as part of the Multinational Force (MNF).²⁸

The structure of the three military contingents was similar: light infantry units protected by armor and artillery. A naval force was deployed in Lebanese waters, while the British bases in Cyprus served as an air support base. The Italian Navy made a considerable effort to maintain in those waters a naval formation,²⁹ yet the Italian Task Force proved to be very different from the French and US. Indeed, Italy decided to give a low war-fighting character to her contingent; Rome never wanted its troops to be perceived as an occupation force. Such a line, more oriented toward a peacekeeping kind of operation, focused more on interaction with the local population and less on force projection, required willingness to accept higher risks in case of attacks, but in the end proved to be very successful.³⁰ The difference in number of casualties cannot be attributed to differences in area of operation due to the fact that the Italians were deployed in an area of Beirut as difficult as any other sector of the town.³¹ The Italian contingent deployed in Lebanon “operated as part of the local environment and it became an active element in restoring normal living conditions. Its soldiers were provided with the training required to acquaint them with the cultural, political and social situation of the people among whom they worked... the Italians carefully nurtured contact with the ordinary citizens and the political leaders in the area.”³² The military hospital was successfully used as a tool to become part of the local environment, providing free health care to more than 65000

locals.³³

In order to become part of the local environment, it is essential that the presence of troops is as unintrusive as possible. US Marine Major Ronald F. Baczkowski explains this aspect. According to Baczkowski, "...Whenever senior Marines spoke of the Italian peacekeeping force, they had nothing but praise for the contingent because of its professionalism and ability to carry out one of the hardest missions in the center of the Palestinian refugee camps. Additionally, the Italians kept the same Commanding General, Brigadier General Angioni, and his staff in Lebanon for the entire length of MNF II. Interestingly, the Italians did not suffer the same type of terrorist attack experienced by the USMNF and the French."³⁴ General Angioni has very well represented the non-intrusive character of the Italian mission, when he explained the approach he used to find a suitable accommodation for the contingent. Indeed, as suggested by the Lebanese liaison officers attached to the Italian contingent, Angioni decided not to use schools and public buildings and looked for buildings not important for the recovery of the local society and economy.³⁵

The overall performance of the contingent was built around the behavior of every single soldier. In the case of the Italians, nobody had previous experience in military deployment abroad. We believe that the "human factor," in terms of sense of responsibility, commonsense and education, as well as respect for human rights and lack of prejudices made the inexperienced Italian Soldier the most suitable in the complex Lebanese environment.

In 1992, Italy deployed a largely draftee-based military contingent in Somalia as part of the UN effort to pacify the region. The approach adopted by the contingent was coherent with the previous experience in Lebanon. Indeed, according to Gen. Bruno Loi,³⁶ the Italian intervention was twofold: on the one side, it was focused on the need to make the environment secure while, on the other side, provided the necessary military force to deliver humanitarian assistance to the local population.³⁷ The contingent focused on dialogue as a means to get in touch with the locals rather than basing the actions on the use of force. "We did not want to be considered an arrogant occupation force" said Gen. Bruno Loi.³⁸ The outcome of this approach was the different level of

security and stability between the Italian and American sectors. Indeed, while in the American sector the level of hostility was constantly high, in the Italian's the situation was very safe and calm. The different approach is well explained by Gen. Bruno Loi: "Once realized the locals may have been hostile, the Americans acted without half measures. On the contrary the Italians continued teaching the children how to till the soil."³⁹

In this context, a fundamental role was played by the decision to restrain as much as possible the use of force. A good example is given by the Italians as they had to regain control of check point "Pasta," previously lost after an ambush in July 1993.⁴⁰ The decision to avoid the use of force to regain the position was clearly motivated by some important considerations. Indeed, while the re-occupation with use of overwhelming force was applicable and realistic, it was not desirable in the light of the possible consequences.⁴¹ The confrontation with local warlords would have caused many civilian casualties, very likely exacerbating the relations with the locals, and thus exposing the units to a dangerous escalation of violence.⁴² Through an intense intelligence activity and a firm mediation conducted by the contingent commander, the Italians regained the checkpoint. In General Loi's words, "the only winner in the battle to reoccupy the check point has been rationality."⁴³

General Loi's decision making confirms that in CE "a Commander needs to have a clear picture of the various confrontations he is in, his objectives for each one, and how one leads to another. 'Winning' a confrontation means obtaining his objectives. However, in the same way that a war-fighting Commander may win a campaign even though he does not win every battle (he may avoid some, and accept a lesser outcome in others), so a peace support Commander need not win every confrontation. He must conduct each one with an eye to those that will come later, and achieve his mission objectives through conducting a sequence of confrontations in which the resolution of one leads to another until all parties are brought into compliance."⁴⁴ With the decision to avoid any retaliation as a consequence of the Italian losses in the fighting at "Pasta," General Loi's showed the ideal form of military leadership⁴⁵ to be performed in CE. Indeed, he was able to provide purpose, direction and motivation to his own troops, inspiring soldiers to do things against

their natural instinct to react violently, to continue carrying out the mission for the greater good of the local population.⁴⁶

In autumn 1991, Italy deployed 5,000 unarmed troops to Albania to conduct Operation Pelican to deliver and to distribute humanitarian aids to the civil population. The majority of the contingent was based on conscripts. The troops were asked to perform essentially logistical tasks, organizing convoys to deliver food in very remote localities of the countries. The operation was successfully executed and the conscripts did not encounter many problems so common with professionals deployed for low intensity operations: stress,⁴⁷ motivation, job satisfaction, and cohesion.⁴⁸

How To Preserve The Human Factor In The Armed Forces

We believe that military professionalism can be adequate to the new tasks requested by Complex Emergencies. However, the increasing complexities of the environment requires for any future Army that the “natural skills” observed in the Italian Soldier – such as the capability to cope with new situations, a high level of empathy to allow a better understanding of the local situation and culture, the aptitude to accept a certain level of uncertainty without stress consequences and the moral courage to restrain the use of force - must be translated into education, training and, as a consequence of those, structural changes in the military organization. Training and education provide guiding principles, while the structure is the framework to deal with changing circumstances. Those are the tools used to provide soldiers the skills to use their judgement assertively in reaction to completely new situations.

Education. *“Ignorance lowers and disgraces the military and often the entire state.”*⁴⁹

The war-fighter ethos and mindset push the soldier to get the job done in the shortest possible time and return home with no desire to understand the native’s culture or to live among them. Vice versa the soldier prepared to deal with CE needs to learn how vital it is to understand the native’s culture. Learning requires an open-minded approach and the will to comprehend

differences. In this process time is essential and, as a consequence, he must develop a good degree of patience.

The aim of the education must focus on the other-than-fighting skills, and on the abilities that must be developed in order to be perceived by the locals as impartial. “Critical thinking, professionally grounded in the controlled application of violence, yet exposed to a broad array of expertise not normally considered as a part of traditional military functions, will help create the capacity to rapidly shift cognitively to a new environment.”⁵⁰

We believe impartiality and empathy are probably the most important objectives for a military organization to achieve in CE. Indeed, if perceived to be impartial such an organization can gain trust, confidence and, as a consequence, cooperation from all the actors in the theatre of operation. However, the path for the future Army to enhance the capability to be impartial runs through the capability to empathize with the locals. This aim can only be accomplished through learning to appreciate cultural differences, foreign languages,⁵¹ history of the country and people of the theatre where the deployment will take place.

An educational path adequate to the non-conventional theatres of operation should then be oriented to mitigate the war-fighter mindset and reinforce the ability to cope with many different actors in an uncertain environment. Therefore, communication techniques, cross-cultural knowledge, public opinion understanding, cultural and religious diversity awareness and problem solving and decision-making in conflicts are the new skills required at every level to reach the educational excellence required to be successful in CE.

Training. In order to successfully deal with complex emergencies a different approach than in combat operations is required. We strongly believe that an effective force in complex emergencies does not need to be a skilled combat unit first. Indeed, while a “conventional” military operation normally requires the application of decisive force to fight and defeat the enemy, in CE the case might be exactly the opposite. The military must be trained to restrain the use of force, and apply it in the proper way only when required by the situation. So that, if in the first case the military should

develop both instinct and skills to be a warfighter, in the latter the requirements are different, closer to those of law enforcement units. Indeed, the ability to deal with civilians and at the same time identify threats among people not wearing an uniform are definitely different from those of the conventional soldier who is trained to identify threats in other soldiers wearing different uniforms.

The "weapons" of the peacekeeper in achieving his objectives are those of negotiation, mediation, quiet diplomacy and reasoning, tact and the patience of a Job, not the self-loading rifle.⁵²

The Italian Army has acquired a very extensive experience in dealing with a low threat civilian environment. Indeed, starting from the 1990's, the Army has been deployed within the Homeland to support law enforcement units to maintain public order and to fight organized criminality.⁵³ Moreover, it has been employed to cooperate with many other organizations in any case of environmental disaster as part of a national civil protection force.

However, the training of a CE force cannot be limited to add some tasks additional to the normal warfighter routine such as escorting convoys, performing personal security operations, conducting check point operations. Indeed, the training must focus on the principle of the use of force only in self-defense to emphasize the idea that every difficult situation in CE can be faced peacefully. The effective implementation of negotiation techniques implies the aptitude to understand other cultures as well as the ability to work in a joint, combined, interagency environment. Therefore, the use of force must be seen as unnecessary and counterproductive as well as the ethic of engaging an opponent with the limited aim to obtain a military victory as the sole role of soldiers. In this context, moral courage to make decisions to restrain the use of force plays the most important role. Therefore, leaders at any level must be trained to further develop this private form of courage, this form of conscience that can often be an even tougher challenge than physical courage, especially in peacetime.⁵⁴

Utilizing the military in response to CE entails an intellectual shift from the warfighter ethos and mind-set towards a civil-military philosophy.⁵⁵ This means that the soldier must also be trained to deal with behavioral, emotional, and social implications. Preparing the new multi-role units

personnel to be ready to operate in a CE environment requires a less extensive military training plan than a conventional unit's, focused on other-than-war activities rather than warfighting. The aim of specialized training is to acquire specific skills to successfully conduct a wide array of activities ranging from establishing basic local services such as the repair, maintenance, or construction of infrastructure (roads, schools, industrial facilities, hospitals, water and sewage facilities) to the capacity to provide a wide variety of services such as civil administration and medical assistance to refugee and indigent populations. Such activities, aimed to meet people's urgent needs, have tremendous effects on the local populace, helping the military to rapidly win hearts and minds while increasing the chances for stability and peace.

Moreover, while every single officer should be instructed on meeting and negotiation techniques, every single soldier in the units must be trained in low-level negotiations, arbitration of disputes and conciliatory techniques. The training should aim to increase the single soldier's ability to deal with unexpected situations using the lowest level of force. Therefore, it should be conducted in mock-ups of urban environment, with soldiers performing role playing kind of scenarios, engaged to solve conflict resolution problems, dealing with group dynamics, and exposed to different situations that require the employment of different levels of force in response to a variety of provocative and aggressive behaviours.

Future operations in response to complex emergencies will be combined and joint. Therefore, the Army should become a proponent of joint and combined cross training programs, aimed to increase the training level, enhancing experience in Multinational/Allied/Coalition procedures and to boost mutual understanding among allies.

Structure. Often, the adjustment of the military structure occurs according to the country's innovators ideas about future conflicts. To be ready to face the uncertainty of the future, the future Army should be organized into two separate and different kind of units: combat and specialized. Combat units are to focus on conventional symmetric and asymmetric conflicts, while the specialized units are to be dedicated exclusively to the niche functions of CE, from peacekeeping to

nation building. The combination of these two types of units will allow the Army to successfully face any conflicts in the range between conventional war and nation building.

Because the majority of modern armies are of the all-volunteer force model, many of the non-military skills that used to characterize the conscripts are missing. Volunteers are less representative of all segments that compose the civilian society than the conscripts. However, the Army still needs those skills to be successful in CE. The Italian Army could provide a possible solution to be studied. The Italian Army is a complete volunteer organization.⁵⁶ However, 2005 was the last year in the transition from conscript system to fully professional organization. In this context, the figure of the Yearly Service Volunteer (VFA) is playing a fundamental role. Indeed, the VFA is a kind of voluntary service, which is still perceived like a substitute for conscription. Because the volunteers who join this system are conscious of the temporariness of their contract, they do not break their ties with the civilian society. Indeed, they still remain members of the society without completely merging in the military's. Under the conscript Army model, the military service was a duty for every male citizen by the Italian Constitution with the purpose to defend the Homeland.⁵⁷ Because the source for the recruits was the entire Italian society, recruits had a broad range of motivations and skills other than military. Indeed, in every conscript army, the soldier was very representative of the civilian society and the barracks became the place where different social classes could come in touch.⁵⁸ Moreover, because the period of enlistment was limited to one year, the link between the soldier and the society remained strong, because the conscript was well aware that he would return back to civilian life very soon. Because his participation in military life was only provisional, he never switched from a civilian to a military mind-set. This factor played a fundamental role when, unexpectedly, conscripts offered positive performances when deployed in PKOs and humanitarian operations.

Therefore, it is worthwhile to reorganize the future Army with VFA units in order to replicate the "conscripts" environment with semi-professionals. Those units, at regimental level⁵⁹ must provide the wider range of capabilities required to successfully deal with CE and post conflicts

operations. Such units should be entirely composed (officers, NCOs and troops) of reservists, signals, engineers, logisticians, medics, civil military cooperation specialists, equipped with suitable gear to be employed also in the event of civil disaster and natural catastrophe. Indeed, we believe that the ideal kind of leadership required to successfully lead such units is definitely different from the combat units. The units' leaders grounding should be focused more on specific professional knowledge (leadership for competence) rather than pure military combat competence.

While the presence of combat arms personnel in this kind of units should be avoided, the possibility of embedding civilians (either contractors, NGOs representatives or interagency personnel) and small units of Carabinieri⁶⁰ must be considered. The results would be multi-role task-organized units which are very flexible, suitable to accomplish a very broad range of tasks, but strongly oriented to conduct operations other than war in an environment where a close contact with the local population is the priority.

These units are organized in modules and therefore can detach specialist teams, platoons, organic companies as "plug and play" forces or deploy as organic regiments according to the need in the theater of operation. Their combat capability should be limited to self-defense, and they should be prepared to use non-lethal weapons.⁶¹ For this reason, according to the scale of violence that characterized the theater of operation, such multi-role units must be deployed as part of a combat unit, to increase the capability to fight of the contingent. The correct task organization of the unit according to the specific operation to be conducted will be of fundamental importance. Indeed, if the situation is stable, the majority of the unit deployed will be composed of the multi-role personnel, while a small element of combat personnel will function as reserve or extraction force.⁶² Yet, if the level of violence is high, the unit to be deployed can be structured with some more robust combat modules. Therefore, the capability of the military contingent deployed to generate and apply lethal force in a co-ordinated and concentrated manner as and when needed, is provided by the combination of the multi-role modules and the combat components.

Conclusion

The changing to the new professional model in Italy is considered the proper way to guarantee, finally, the necessary functionality to the military instrument, in order to fully and properly accomplish the assigned tasks, especially those related to the obligations of Italy originating from it belonging to International Organizations as the European Union and to the NATO. Indeed it has been very much welcomed by the Italian military establishment. However, with the switch to the professional model, the Italian Army like many others lost many capabilities. Among them, the most important is the one offered by the conscripts, with their naturally developed capability to successfully interact with other people/actors.

The reorganization of the future Army with the development of a multi-role component to be built up in parallel to the combat component, will enhance its capabilities to successfully deal with CE. Indeed, the conduct of Military Operations Other Than War will not be one task among the many assigned to the professional soldier anymore, but it will become “the task” for the designated units. So that, it becomes clear that in addition to the standard military tasks assigned to the combat forces, the Army will be able to efficiently undertake a wide range of activities related to the economy, living conditions and the democratic institutions of the Country where operations are conducted, thanks to the multi-role units.

Experience dictates that there are many difficulties in building an effective cooperation between the military and the myriad of other actors operating in the same CE environment. However we believe the specialized training and education to be provided to all the personnel in the units, in conjunction with the perception of a “less warrior” soldier, will enhance the ability of the military to interact with other organizations. This factor will definitely help to overcome the natural friction developed among all the diverse actors and it will powerfully contribute to build an effective partnership with many of them. The new multi-role system will be demonstrated to be efficient and cost effective. Indeed, in its specialized components it possesses a broad panoply of civil as well as military capabilities relevant to successfully operate within the whole spectrum of conflict.

We also strongly believe that the operational contribution the multi-role units could give in a CE environment is fundamental. The capabilities to build *ex-novo* or re-establish the essential services and infrastructures in the theatre of operation is a major contribution to eradicate armed resistance. Indeed, as experienced in Iraq by Gen. Chiarelli, “The task force’s understanding of the importance of establishing essential city services came from analysis of enemy actions in relation to current infrastructure. Cell congregations, red zones, and anti coalition, antigovernment religious rhetoric originated from those areas of Baghdad characterized by low electrical distribution, sewage running raw through the streets, little to no potable water distribution, and no solid waste pickup. Concurrently, unemployment rates rocketed in these extremely impoverished areas and health care was almost nonexistent. A direct correlation existed between the level of local infrastructure status, unemployment figures, and attacks on U.S. soldiers.”⁶³

¹ The term "Complex Emergency" entered UN usage toward the end of the 1980's. With its emphasis on multi-casualty, it was coined in Mozambique as a conceptual device which could allow the UN to conduct negotiations with both the government and Renamo movement. In 1989, it was extended to help describe the negotiated cross-border Operation Lifeline in South Sudan. Following the establishment of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs in 1992 (now called Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA), the term has gradually entered the public domain.

² The VFA serves in the Italian Army for 12 months. The draft service obligation was 10 months. The opportunity to be well rewarded in terms of money, ease the transition of the military instrument from the mixed configuration (draft and volunteers) to the professional one (only volunteers), because the obligation of draft service can be given back with a service of only two months longer than the compulsory one, but better rewarded. The system of recruitment is extremely simple and allows the citizens to make the military service in the moment and the place that they choose. In other words, the enlistments are carried out in the nearest Military District Command or in the Regiments where service is wanted be lend. All the Italian male citizens can aim to the enlistment: the only condition is that they had a sanitary profile in compliance with that one demanded for the conscription. Regarding the possibilities of career, the VFAs can participate to the competitions for the recruitments like VFBs (Short Service Volunteers), VSP (Permanent Service Volunteers), NCOs and Officers. The professional qualifications and the specializations acquired during the service are recognized like title for the participation to the competitions in Public Administration and for the registration in the employment lists.

³ This concept has been elaborated by the author of this paper. However it has been based on the concept explained in the paper "Scenario Development for Crisis response Operations. How to Include the Mental Component?" downloaded from <http://www.rmcs.cranfield.ac.uk/infoserv/ISMOR/ISMOR/2002/TNO.pdf>, accessed on October 2, 2005.

⁴ Applegate, Obe. "Observations on the Use Of Force In Complex Emergencies." *RUSI Journal*, Feb. 2002, p. 22.

⁵ Sergio Vieira de Mello was Under-Secretary-General and Emergency Relief Coordinator in the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

⁶ Downloaded from: http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/ocha_orientation_handbook_on_.htm, accessed on November 23, 2005.

⁷ Downloaded from: http://coe-dmha.org/Unicef/HPT_Session1Intro.htm, accessed November 23, 2005.

⁸ Stability Operations are activities conducted by military and other government components to establish, re-establish or support a foreign government's ability to assure rule of law and internal security, to provide basic human services (healthcare, water, electricity, education), and to protect its borders and promote its foreign interests including cooperation with regional and international partners and deterrence of potential aggressors. Stability operations may include, but are not necessarily limited to, security, humanitarian assistance, limited governance, restoration of essential public services, and other reconstruction assistance. Stability operations are multi-agency operations that involve all instruments of national and multinational power, action and influence, to support major conventional combat operations if necessary; to establish or re-establish security; to facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; to re-establish the political, social, and economic architecture and infrastructure; and to facilitate the transition to legitimate local governance. Phil Kearley, "Stability Operations Concepts and Capabilities Emerging From JFCOM/Joint Experimentation." November 4, 2004. Downloaded from <http://www.act.nato.int/organization/transformation/cde04presentations/4novstabilityopsbo/kearly.pdf>, accessed on November 28, 2005.

⁹ The Department Of Defense issued the "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations on November 28, 2005. The directive states: Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning. Stability operations are conducted to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society. Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces. Downloaded from: http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d300005_112805/d300005p.pdf accessed on February 11, 2006.

¹⁰ Nigel Howard and Peter Murray-Jones, "Confrontation Analysis: a Command and Control System for Conflicts Other Than War." Homepage www.dodccrp.org, accessed on August 30, 2005, p. IX.

¹¹ Howard, Nigel. "Confrontation Analysis, How to Win Operations Other Than War." Department of Defense C4ISR Cooperative Research Program, Washington D.C., 1999, p. 7.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p.15.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹⁵ The Newsweek reporter Colin Soloway in his article "I Yelled Them To Stop" depicts a recent example. He

described the frustration of a member of a Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) during Operation Mountain Sweep, conducted in Afghanistan in the Khowst-Gardez area in August 2002. The unit had operated in the region for some time and had developed a close rapport with local villagers. During a routine search, members of ODA arrived at the home of an elderly male villager, knocked on his door, and explained that they were searching for weapons. The elderly man allowed the ODA to enter his home after he sent the female inhabitants of the house to another room, out of sight of the strange men in accordance with a local custom. After the search, the elderly man invited the ODA members to stay for tea and conversation. On their departure, the ODA members thanked the gentleman and moved on, leaving the inhabitants with their pride and dignity intact. Moments later, the ODA watched as several 82d Airborne Division soldiers came to the same home, kicked down the front door, and forcibly entered the house. The ODA commander shouted for them to stop, but the elderly man who had just served tea was slammed to the ground by the soldiers from the 82d, who also attempted to frisk the women. The ODA commander sprinted back to the scene and ordered the soldiers to disengage. The ordeal was over almost as quickly as it had begun. However, the women were furious, and the elderly man had been dishonored and humiliated. According to SF sources, local villagers and officials viewed Operation Mountain Sweep as a resounding failure. Local opinions often matter most, and their opinion was that Army units were successful only at "terrorizing innocent villagers and ruining the rapport that Special Forces had built up with local communities." Downloaded from http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume3/august_2005/7_05_1.html#16 accessed on November 24, 2005.

¹⁶ James Carafano, Post Conflict Operations, From Europe to Iraq, Heritage Foundation n. 844, 21 June 2004, p. 2, downloaded from: <http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl844.cfm>, accessed on 18 August 2005.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Thomas Britt, "Psychological Ambiguities in Peacekeeping," in H. Langholtz (ed.), *The Psychology of Peacekeeping*, Praeger Editions, Westport, CT 1998, p.112.

¹⁹ Joe Strange, *Capital "W" War: A Case for Strategic Principles of War*, US Marine Corps University, Quantico, 1998, p.267.

²⁰ The quote is attributed to the former U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld.

²¹ "For the first time, visible signs of the future emerged with clear movement toward a functioning sewage system, a functioning fresh water system, electricity being wired to every house, and trash being picked up out of the streets. Those performing the projects were residents from Sadr City. The extraordinary effort by the leaders and soldiers of Task Force Baghdad to synchronize the elements needed to implement the "first mile" projects within Sadr City were to pay big dividends not only to the people of Sadr City, but to the force protection of the soldiers of Task Force Baghdad." From Chiarelli, Peter and Mickaelis, Patrick. "Winning the Peace. The Requirements for Full Spectrum Operations." *Military Review*, July-August 2005, p. 4-5.

²² In Bosnia, US forces were required to move with a minimum of four vehicles. This requirement significantly decreased force mobility and effectiveness. The same thing occurred in Rwanda, where "unarmed women were driving throughout the countryside, alone, as were the rest of the NGO personnel," but when American troops moved, they used "HUMVEE's with mounted .50 caliber machine-guns at the front and rear of the convoy. No matter the context, they always wore their flak jacket and helmet." Hence, "even where and when present, [military forces] were generally less prepared to take risks than the humanitarians whom they were there to protect." Bradd C. Hayes and Jeffrey I. Sands, "Doing Windows. Non Traditional Military Response to Complex Emergencies," p. 68. Downloaded from www.dodccrp.org accessed November 15, 2005.

²³ Ibid. p. 70.

²⁴ "Young Marines will be required to make rapid, well-reasoned, independent decisions while facing a bewildering array of challenges and threats. These decisions will be subject to the harsh scrutiny of both the media and the court of public opinion." Gen. Charles Krulak, "Cultivating Intuitive Decisionmaking," *Marine Corps Gazette*, May 1999, p. 18.

²⁵ Italy has deployed thousands of troops in the more diverse environments, as part of UN, NATO, EU or Multinational missions: Multinational Missions: Libano 1 and Libano 2 (1982 – 1984); Missione "Airone" - Kurdistan (1991); Operation "Ippocampo" - Ruanda (1994); Operation "Alba" - Albania (1997); Operation "Stabilise" - Timor Est (1999 - 2000); ISAF - Afghanistan (2002 - 2003); Operation "Enduring Freedom" - Afghanistan (2003); Operazione "Antica Babilonia" - Iraq (2003). ONU Missions: UNIFIL - Libano (1979 - ongoing); UNTAG - Namibia (1989 - 1990); UNOCA - Afghanistan (marzo 1989 - ottobre 1990); UNOSOM – "Ibis" - Somalia (1992 - 1994); ONUMOZ - "Albatros" - Mozambico (1993 - 1994), UNMIS - Operation "Nilo" - Sudan (2005). NATO Missions: Missione IFOR/SFOR - Bosnia-Erzegovina (1995 - 2004); Missione Joint Guarantor - Macedonia (1998 - 1999); Missione KFOR - Kosovo (1999 - in corso); Missione Allied Harbour - Albania (1999); Task Force Essential Harvest - Macedonia (2001); Operazione Amber Fox- Allied Harmony - Macedonia (2002 - 2003); ISAF - Afghanistan (2003 - ongoing); Operazione "Indus" - Pakistan (2005 - ongoing). EU Missions: EUFOR – "Concordia" - FYROM (2003); EUFOR – "Althea" - Bosnia-Erzegovina (2004 - ongoing).

²⁶ By the end of the 1990s, Italy has become the third major contributor of troops and personnel (after the US and the UK) to peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations directly managed by the UN or entrusted by the Security Council to regional organizations or so-called coalitions of the willing. Today nearly three thousand troops are deployed

for a “humanitarian mission” in Nassyria in Iraq.

²⁷ According to the Italian Defense Minister, during his speech to the Defense Committee on September 3, 1982, the decision to deploy the 2nd Bersaglieri battalion was motivated by two factors. At that time the Italian Army General Staff had a rough contingency plan to be ready to deploy units abroad to participate in multinational peace support operations. In this plan, the designated unit was the 2nd Bersaglieri battalion. At that time, this unit belong to the 3rd Corps, stationed in Milan. Alternative options were to deploy a paratrooper unit or another infantry battalion belonging to the 5th Corps. In the first case all the Para brigade was strategic reserve, so the decision was not to commit it, while in the other case, all the 5th Corps had units tasked to defend the eastern Italian border against any attempt of the Warsaw Pact to invade. Another reason why the Bersaglieri were chosen was because they were considered to be well known abroad. However, after the Sabra and Chatila massacre, the Italian contingent was formed with a Para battalion as a base.

²⁸ The first mission started August 26th and lasted until September 11th 1982, with 519 soldiers on the ground. The second mission was deployed on September 24th and it lasted until March 6th 1984. The average strength of the contingent was 2.300 men.

²⁹ The formation was composed of eight combat units besides several support ships under the command of Admiral Giasone Piccioni, one of the most experienced Italian seamen at the time. To fully appreciate the Italian contribution, it is enough to highlight that the United States, surprisingly deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean a fleet of only twenty units.

³⁰ Lelio Lagorio, “Il New Deal Italiano degli Anni Ottanta: La Spedizione militare in Libano 1982 – 1984,” *Rivista Marittima* Autunno 2003, p.5.

³¹ Paolo Tripodi, *Peacekeeping: Let the Conscripts Do the Job*, Security Dialogue Vol.32, n.2, June 2001, p.158.

³² Marianne Heiberg & Johan Jørgen Holst, “Peacekeeping in Lebanon: comparing UNIFIL and the MNF,” *Survival*, vol. 28 n. 5, September/October 1986, pp. 411.

³³ The field hospital activities earned the Italian contingent international admiration and especially the gratitude of the refugee camp inhabitants who enjoyed continuous assistance, free of charge by efficient medical personnel. The hospital was originally created for military purposes. It was set up by Friuli Motorized brigade and had the following personnel: 93 medical officers, 6 pharmacists, 41 health NCOs and 147 volunteer nurses from the Italian Red Cross. 614 military personnel were admitted to the hospital, while about 65,000 civilians were examined and treated. There were also two ambulances, which brought medical services to the refugee camps every day. In Leonardo Martella, *Comparison Between Italian and American Mission During Multinational Force II, Beirut 1982-84*, Marine Corps University paper, p. 31.

³⁴ Major Ronald F. Baczkowski, “Tactical Lessons For Peacekeeping: U.S. Multinational Force In Beirut.” Downloaded from: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1995/BRF.htm> accessed on 18 October 2005.

³⁵ Franco Angioni, *Un Soldato Italiano in Libano*. Milano: Rizzoli, 1984, p.31.

³⁶ General Bruno Loi was the Italian contingent commander in Somalia until September 6, 1993.

³⁷ Bruno Loi, *Peace-keeping. Pace o Guerra? Una Risposta Italiana. l’Operazione Ibis in Somalia*. Vallecchi, Milano 2004, p.154.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p.154.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p.152.

⁴⁰ According to Gen. Loi, Starlin Aroush, a young Somali intellectual who studied in Italy, went to Italy in 1994 to meet him. She reported that on July 2, 1993 Aedeed (wanted by the UN) was hiding in the Haliwa neighborhood where the Italians were about to conduct a search operation. Feeling the danger to be captured, Aedeed ordered a distracting action on the check point, to lure the troops out of the area. From Bruno Loi, *Peace-keeping. Pace o Guerra? Una Risposta Italiana. l’Operazione Ibis in Somalia*. Vallecchi, Milano 2004, p. 119.

⁴¹ “General Bruno Loi, the Ibis Commander, stressed that, when the attack began, Italian troops were extremely well supported by armored vehicles, heavy guns and helicopters. However, he added, we could not open fire against civilians despite the fact that gunmen were hiding among the crowd. What the kind of support we had we could have killed a huge number of people. We did not want that. We did not hesitate to use our guns when we identified isolated snipers.” From Paolo Tripodi, “Peacekeeping: Let the Conscripts Do the Job,” *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 32, June 2001, p. 160.

⁴² According to Gen. Bruno Loi, “the use of overwhelming force was in contrast with the humanitarian spirit of the mission and, counterproductive on both military and political level.” Bruno Loi, *Peace-keeping. Pace o Guerra? Una Risposta Italiana. l’Operazione Ibis in Somalia*. Vallecchi, Milano 2004, p.132.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p.135.

⁴⁴ Nigel Howard and Peter Murray-Jones, “Confrontation Analysis: a Command and Control System for Conflicts Other Than War.” Homepage www.dodccrp.org, accessed on August 30, 2005.

⁴⁵ “Military Leadership is the process of influencing others to accomplish the mission by providing purpose, direction, and motivation.” *Field Manual 22-100: Army Leadership*, HQ, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., June 1987, p. 3.

⁴⁶ Interestingly enough, the decision to avoid the use of force in that occasion, opened a bitter confrontation between Italy and the United Nations in July 1993, when General Loi was accused of being instructed by the Italian military

headquarters in Rome to obey their orders rather than those of the UN command in Mogadishu. The different approach to the problem was also emphasized by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. Beniamino Andreatta. Indeed, in his address to the General Assembly on September 30, 1993, Mr. Andreatta reaffirmed Italy's position concerning the aims and the working of the UNOSOM II operation and appealed for a political solution to the Somali crisis. He proposed to nominate an international mediator and to resort to the "Addis Abeba Conference" in order to strengthen the political option and to facilitate the dialogue between the different Somali parties. He also highlighted the need to concentrate the Italian and international efforts on the reconstruction of Somalia's economic and social structures together with its new government and public administration. From Claudia Baroni, *New perspectives on UNOSOM II and the Italian attitude, Peacekeeping and International Relations*. Clementspot: Jan 1994, Vol.23, Iss. 1, p.4.

⁴⁷ The very demanding nature of Peace Support Operations has been definitely asserted and demonstrated. Far from being considered no risky at all, PSOs have been recognised to be missions with various and lower levels of risk (when compared to conventional combat operations), but with an anyway high level of stress as far as troops and leaders are concerned. Marina Nuciari, "Flexibility Towards Diversity. New Skills for Military Personnel in PSOs." Paper submitted to the Annual Conference 2002 of the Committee on Women in NATO Forces, "Team Building Towards New Challenges". Session on EE Strategies. New PSO's Skills, May 28th, 2002, Brussels, NATO Headquarters.

⁴⁸ "For the conscripts, joining Operation Pelican was a short term commitment, but, more than this, it was an opportunity to leave behind the boredom of the barracks. They could embark on new and exiting experiences, get to know new places and earn good money, especially in comparison with the poor salary that they were used to receiving. The presence of these elements led to a positive evaluation of the mission by Pelican's military personnel and to an appreciation of their duties... it would be correct to assume that combat-trained military personnel would feel degraded performing duties in which the military aspect is minimal. From Paolo Tripodi, "Peacekeeping: Let the Conscripts Do the Job," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 32, June 2001, p. 159.

⁴⁹ Charles Edward White, *The Enlightened Soldier*, Praeger Publications, Westport CT 1989, p.9.

⁵⁰ Peter Chiarelli and Patrick Mickaelis, "Winning the Peace. The Requirements for Full Spectrum Operations," *Military Review*, July-August 2005, p. 15.

⁵¹ The Italian Army already requires that every officer graduated from the Military Academy must have a certain proficiency in a second language to be chosen among English, French, Spanish, Portuguese and German. Learning a second language is already part of the regular curriculum of both the Italian officer and the Italian Sergeant Major. The Joint Military Foreign Languages School (JMFLS) is in charge to provide this kind of education in cooperation with the Military Academies. We see, as a major improvement, to add the basic knowledge of a third language for every officer and SM. The language in this case should be chosen among Arabic (with different dialects), Chinese, Russian, Korean, Serb and Albanian. The JMFLS already possesses the expertise because that kind of instruction is foreseen for selected personnel. The curriculum should be aimed not only to give a very basic knowledge of the language, but also to provide a broad understanding of the culture. It should be a 3 months - 8 hours per day full immersion with native speaker teachers, to be attended at the end of the instructional path to become an officer (Military Academy). The level of proficiency in studying those "rare" languages should become a factor in the promotion system for officers and NCO's. A basic understanding of the same foreign languages must be extended to the lowest rank in the Army.

⁵² Indar Jit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle, Bjorn Egge. *The Thin Blue Line, International Peacekeeping and Its Future*. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974), 12-13.

⁵³ Operation "VESPRI SICILIANI" (Sicily, 1992 - 1998); Operation "TESTUGGINE" (Italy-Slovenia border, 1993 - 1995); Operation "RIACE" (Calabria, 1994 - 1995); Operation "PARTENOPE" (Napoli, 1994 - 1995 and 1997 - 1998); Operation "SALENTO" (Puglia, 1995); Operation "DOMINO" (Italia, 2001 - ongoing).

⁵⁴ FMFM 1-0 Leading Marines, Department of the Navy, HQ USMC, Washington D.C., January 3, 1995, p. 61.

⁵⁵ On the day before the 2000 Presidential election, George W. Bush launched a final attack on Al Gore. "I'm worried about an opponent who uses nation building and the military in the same sentence," he said... Everything, especially the role of the military changed after Sept. 11, 2001. Joe Klein, *It' Time for Extreme Peacekeeping*, Time, November 24, 2003, p.25.

⁵⁶ The Law 14 November 2000, n. 331 "Norms for the institution of the professional military service" decreed that the Italian Armed Forces must be composed entirely of professionals. However, such law does not arrange the complete abrogation of the conscription, but decrees its suspension within seven years from the coming into force of the Law itself.

⁵⁷ The Italian Constitution promulgated in 1946, enunciates at the art. 52: "La Difesa della Patria è sacro dovere del cittadino. Il servizio militare è obbligatorio nei limiti e modi stabiliti dalla legge. Il suo adempimento non pregiudica la posizione di lavoro del cittadino, né l'esercizio dei diritti politici. L'ordinamento delle Forze Armate si informa allo spirito democratico della Repubblica (The Defence of the Native land is a holy duty of the Citizen. The conscription is obligatory in the limits and ways established by the law. Its implementation do not undermine the position of job of the Citizen, neither the exercise of the political rights. The Military code is imbued with the democratic spirit of the Republic)."

⁵⁸ Battistelli F. (2003), "L'opinione pubblica italiana e la difesa", *Quaderni di Sociologia*, XLVII, n. 32, 2003, pp. 8-36.

⁵⁹ In the Italian Army the regiment is composed of a battalion plus a company.

⁶⁰ As a result of the particular combination of Member of the Armed Forces and Police Authority, the Carabinieri Force has the following responsibilities: Military (defence of the nation, its institutions and resources in the case of a national disaster; participation in military operations in Italy and abroad, policing operations abroad, and through international mandates and agreements, reconstruction of local police forces in areas where peacekeeping forces are present; exclusive function of security and military police for the Armed Forces; functions of judicial military police for Military Justice bodies; the security of Italian diplomatic institutions including military institutions abroad; assistance to military personnel involved in institutional activities in the national territory; mobilization services). Police (functions of judicial and public order and security policing; national civilian protection structure guaranteeing continuity of service in disaster areas and aid to the local population). Downloaded from: www.carabinieri.it accessed on November 2, 2005.

⁶¹ An effective means of proportionate force against low-level threats. In one instance, a Somali attacked a soldier with a knife. Instead of shooting the Somali, other soldiers nearby used the spray. Although the spray worked and the Marine escaped unharmed, the Somali had attempted to stab one Marine four times before he was subdued with the spray. In this case, deadly force may have been called for, but the Marines saw cayenne pepper spray as a substitute for deadly force. Jonathan T. Dworken, "Rules of Engagement: Lessons from Restore Hope," *Military Review*, September 1994, p.31.

⁶² Extraction force is a term used to define a contingency military force ready to intervene in an emergency to extract other units or designated personnel from the theatre of operation.

⁶³ Peter Chiarelli and Patrick Mickaelis, "Winning the Peace. The Requirements for Full Spectrum Operations," *Military Review*, July-August 2005, p. 10.

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